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Against “experience” 
Peter J. Lewis 
 
Abstract: 
Just as Bell proposed that we excise the word “measurement” from physics, so I propose that we 
should excise the word “experience”: “experience” and its cognates should not appear in the 
formulation of any physical theory, including quantum mechanics and its various interpretations. 
The reasons are more or less the same as Bell gives for “measurement”: “experience” is a vague 
term, and experiencing systems are made out of atoms obeying quantum mechanics. Bell’s 
exhortation concerning “measurement” has largely been taken on board in the foundations of 
quantum mechanics. But appeals to “experience” remain—in part, I will argue, because of a bad 
argument that can be traced back to von Neumann, and in part because of mistaken impressions 
about the fundamentality of experience. 
 
1. Against “measurement” 
Thirty years ago, J. S. Bell gave a talk called “Against “measurement”” (Bell 1990).1 In it, he 
laments a particular kind of imprecision in the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. He 
locates the source of this imprecision in the use of certain “bad words” in textbook discussions: 
“system, apparatus, environment, microscopic, macroscopic, reversible, irreversible, observable, 
information, measurement” (1990, 34). He singles out the word “measurement” as particularly 
bad: “the word has had such a damaging effect on the discussion, that I think it should now be 
banned altogether in quantum mechanics” (1990, 34). I argue here that Bell’s list of bad words 
                                                
1 The conference was 62 Years of Uncertainty, Erice, Sicily, 5–14 August 1989. 
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needs to be extended to include experience and its cognates like awareness, perception, 
observation and consciousness. The word “experience”, too, should be banned altogether in 
quantum mechanics. 
 Of course, Bell’s suggestion is hyperbolic: you couldn’t, and shouldn’t, excise the word 
“measurement” from physics altogether. His point is rather about the role the word should play: 
it’s fine for the word “measurement” to appear in an application of a physical theory, but it’s not 
OK for it to appear in the formulation of the theory. Similarly, my suggestion is hyperbolic: there 
is no need to completely excise the word “experience” from physics—although in this case, it 
seems like you could. It’s fine to discuss how the experiences of human observers arise in 
various applications of quantum mechanics—and indeed, as we shall see, such discussions play 
an important role in the philosophical literature concerning the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. But it’s not OK for the word “experience” to appear as a primitive in the theory 
itself. 
 The basic reasons for the elimination of “experience” are parallel to those Bell gives for 
“measurement”. One of Bell’s concerns is that there is no clear answer to the question “What 
exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of “measurer”?” (1990, 34). Many kinds 
of physical systems can constitute measuring devices, and there is at best a vague line between 
those physical interactions that count as measurements and those that do not. Vague terms have 
no place in the foundations of a precise physical theory. Another of his concerns is that any 
measuring device “can be seen as being made out of atoms” (1990, 36). In that case, since atoms 
are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics, an appeal to measurement in the foundations of 
quantum mechanics becomes viciously circular, “like a snake trying to swallow itself by the tail” 
(1990, 36). 
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 The same can be said of experience. What exactly qualifies some physical systems to 
play the role of “experiencer”? Many kinds of physical systems can constitute experiencers, 
including vertebrates with centralized nervous systems and cephalopods with more distributed 
ones (Godfrey-Smith 2016). The limits of experience are vague within a species (Brown, Lydic 
and Schiff 2010) and across species (Schwitzgebel 2018). And experiencing systems are, of 
course, made of atoms, so an appeal to experience in the foundations of quantum mechanics 
would be viciously circular. 
 So one might take my thesis here to be a simple extension of Bell’s. Indeed, some of 
Bell’s arguments seem to be directly about experiencing systems rather than measuring 
instruments: “Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of 
years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some 
better qualified system … with a PhD?” (1990, 34). But in fact, the character of our arguments is 
somewhat different. 
 Bell is primarily taking to task the standard theory of quantum mechanics and the 
textbook writers who present that theory. He gives substantial evidence that talk of 
“measurement” is pervasive and problematic in such textbooks. And his message has largely 
been taken on board, at least by the foundations of physics community. Bell can be taken as 
giving a particularly forceful expression of the measurement problem, and the main business of 
work in the foundations of quantum mechanics in recent years has been to solve, dissolve, or 
explain away the measurement problem. One can no longer blithely appeal to measurement in 
the formulation of a version of quantum mechanics; any such appeal would at least require a lot 
of footnotes. 
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 Quantum mechanics textbooks do not typically appeal to “experience”. They do appeal to 
“observation”, but this can typically be taken as a synonym for “measurement” rather than as a 
synonym for “experience”. So my complaint is not against textbook formulations. Rather, it 
largely concerns responses to the measurement problem—attempts to formulate quantum 
mechanics without appealing to measurement as a primitive term. A few of these directly appeal 
to experience as a primitive term—e.g. Wigner (1961). But more often, “experience” and its 
cognates show up in the surrounding discussion. 
 It is trickier, I think, to say what’s wrong with these appeals to “experience” than with 
appeals to “measurement”. In part, this is because it is rather obvious, when it is pointed out, that 
measurements don’t constitute a primitive, unanalyzable kind. This is not so obvious when it 
comes to experience—it seems to some people that experience or consciousness is primitive or 
unanalyzable, and this makes it harder to say what’s wrong with treating it as such. A second 
difficulty with saying what’s wrong with appeals to “experience” is that there are legitimate and 
important discussions of experience in the literature on responses to the measurement problem, 
so this can’t be a blanket condemnation. The best way to proceed, I think, is to by way of some 
illustrative examples—good, bad, and ugly. 
 
2. The good 
If, as Bell insists, you can’t use “measurement” in the formulation of quantum mechanics, the 
theory needs to be reformulated to avoid any such use. There are, of course, various ways of 
doing this. One way is to replace the textbook “collapse on measurement” with a spontaneous 
collapse process, as in the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986). The spontaneous 
collapse approach raises various interpretational questions, and these questions can’t be 
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answered without talking about measurement, and about experience. These uses of 
“measurement” and “experience” are perfectly good. 
 The interpretational questions arise because of the way the GRW theory works. For a 
single particle, or a small collection of particles, the probability of a spontaneous collapse to a 
well-localized position during a reasonable period of time is very small. But for a macroscopic 
collection of particles, the probability of such a collapse is high, even during a small fraction of a 
second. So as long as all measuring devices record their outputs using the position of some 
macroscopic object, the GRW collapse process ensures that measurements have determinate 
outcomes. 
 This raises a legitimate question about the nature of measurement: Is it safe to assume 
that measuring devices always display their outputs using the position of a macroscopic object? 
Albert and Vaidman (1989) consider this question and answer it in the negative. In particular, 
they note that a cathode-ray TV screen can be used to display the output of a quantum 
measurement, and the production of a visible dot on such a screen involves too few particles to 
reliably produce a GRW collapse. 
 Note that nothing in Albert and Vaidman’s critique of the spontaneous collapse program 
treats “measurement” as an unanalyzed primitive; indeed, the whole point is to analyze our 
actual measuring devices to see if they fulfill the assumptions required for the GRW approach to 
deliver determinate measurement outcomes. Hence their use of “measurement” does not fall foul 
of Bell’s prohibition. 
 Albert and Vaidman go on to ask a similar question about experience. If, as they argue, a 
TV screen measuring device won’t precipitate a GRW collapse, will the observation of such a 
device by a human being precipitate a collapse? The question is whether the human brain 
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represents distinct visual experiences in terms of distinct positions of a macroscopic number of 
particles. This question is answered affirmatively by Aicardo et al. (1991): even if we use a 
measuring device that doesn’t reliably precipitate a GRW collapse, because of the way human 
brains work, such a collapse will be reliably produced in the brain of a human observer. 
 Again, nothing in this investigation treats “experience” as an unanalyzed primitive; the 
whole point is to analyze the way visual experiences are actually grounded in human 
neurophysiology to see if they fulfill the assumptions required for the GRW approach to deliver 
determinate visual experiences. This use of “experience” is entirely appropriate.2 
 There are further questions that arise in this context. For example, even if actual human 
brains reliably precipitate GRW collapses, is it the case that any possible brain would do so? 
Albert (1992, 107) uses thought-experiments involving people with brain implants to argue that 
the answer to this question is “no”. In particular, he envisions a person for whom an experience 
is grounded in the position of a single particle. For such a person, a measurement using a 
cathode-ray TV screen probably won’t precipitate a GRW collapse even in the person’s brain, 
and so probably won’t produce a determinate experience. This thought-experiment raises tricky 
issues; I return to it in section 5. 
 
3. The bad 
Let us now turn to a case where I think that the word “experience” is used badly. The case 
concerns Bohm’s (1952) hidden variable theory, another way of reformulating quantum 
mechanics to avoid “collapse on measurement”. Rather than reconceiving collapse as a 
                                                
2 See Gao (2017, 134) for a similar “good” example: Gao considers the details of 
neurophysiology to argue that an observer will have determinate experiences under his preferred 
collapse model. 
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spontaneous process, Bohm’s theory stipulates that the quantum state never undergoes a collapse 
at all. Instead, Bohm’s theory supplements the quantum state with a set of particles with 
determinate positions, which move such that the probability distribution for the particle locations 
is always given by the Born rule. 
 Measurement has a natural interpretation in Bohm’s theory: the quantum state gives us a 
probability distribution over all the possible particle locations, and measurement reveals where 
the particles actually are. But there is a potential issue here that needs attention: after a 
measurement, we know where the particles are, and yet because there is no collapse, the quantum 
state hasn’t changed. This threatens the Born rule, which says that the probability distribution for 
any observable quantity, including particle locations, is always given by |y|2 (the squared 
amplitude of the quantum state, written in the relevant basis). 
 Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (1992) address this issue, seeking to show that the Born rule 
can be given a consistent interpretation within Bohm’s theory. They ask whether it is possible to 
learn more about the locations of the Bohmian particles than is given by |y|2. They derive a result 
they call “absolute uncertainty” which answers this question in the negative: “no devices 
whatsoever, based on any present or future technology, will provide us with the corresponding 
knowledge. In a Bohmian universe such knowledge is absolutely unattainable!” (1992, 884). 
 This result secures the consistency of the Born rule, but at an apparently devastating cost: 
since the particle locations in Bohm’s theory are supposed to tell us the actual outcome of our 
measurement, if we can’t find out the locations of the Bohmian particles with greater precision 
than given by |y|2, and there is no collapse, then we can’t find out the outcome of our 
measurement! That is, “absolute uncertainty” might be taken to entail that Bohm’s theory doesn’t 
solve the measurement problem after all (Stone 1994). 
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 But this conclusion is based on a misreading of Dürr et al.’s result: the |y|2 appearing in 
“absolute uncertainty” is the effective state, not the full quantum state of the system (Maudlin 
1995). If the state is written in an appropriate basis, it can typically be written as a sum of terms, 
only one of which is relevant (for practical purposes) to the future motion of the Bohmian 
particles; this term is the effective state. When the position of a particle is measured, the effective 
state depends on the accuracy of the measurement. That is, if your position measurement has an 
accuracy of 1mm, the post-measurement effective state has a width of 1mm, and you learn the 
actual position of the particle to within 1mm. After the measurement, you don’t know the 
position of the particle with greater accuracy than is given by (post-measurement) |y|2, but you 
do know the position of the particle with greater accuracy than is given by pre-measurement |y|2. 
Hence the particle positions do, after all, tell you the actual outcome of the measurement. 
 The possibility of misreading “absolute uncertainty” is not my concern here.3 My concern 
is with an exception to “absolute uncertainty” suggested by Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì: “There 
is one situation where we may, in fact, know more about configurations than what is conveyed 
by the quantum equilibrium hypothesis r =|y|2: when we ourselves are part of the system!” 
(1992, 903). This exception is where things go bad. 
 Why should there be such an exception? Stone (1994), because he (mistakenly) thinks 
that “absolute uncertainty” precludes us from learning anything about the locations of the 
particles, suggests that Dürr et al. postulate the exception in a vain attempt to secure determinate 
outcomes to our measurements. That is, Stone suggests that their idea is that direct awareness of 
the locations of certain particles in your brains tells you the outcome of your measurement. But 
                                                
3 See Lewis (forthcoming) for further discussion of this misreading, and of the related question 
of whether knowledge of measurement outcomes would allow superluminal signaling. 
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this attempt is in vain, Stone argues, because Dürr et al.’s “absolute uncertainty” means that the 
locations of these particles in your brain must be inaccessible to the rest of your brain, and hence 
you couldn’t, after all, be aware of them. 
 As discussed above, there is no need for an exception for this purpose: you can learn 
about the locations of Bohmian particles in your measuring device, and by the same token, the 
locations of the Bohmian particles in one part of your brain are accessible by the rest of your 
brain without any exception to “absolute uncertainty”.4 So again: why the exception? 
 I suspect the reason goes deeper than Stone suspects: it is not that Dürr et al. postulate the 
exception as an ad hoc fix to a problem in their account, but rather that they think that any 
physical theory must contain some such exception. It is not hard to construct a tempting 
argument for this claim. Consider a spin measurement on a particle whose state is a symmetric 
superposition of spin-up and spin-down eigenstates. If the particle is passed through an 
inhomogeneous magnetic field, the result is a superposition of two wave packets, one deflected 
upwards and the other deflected downwards. The Bohmian particle follows one component or 
the other depending on its initial position. But how do we know which wave packet contains the 
particle? 
 Well, to find out, we can run the particle into a fluorescent screen, resulting in a 
superposition of two terms, one describing a flash at the top of the screen and one describing a 
flash at the bottom. Again, the Bohmian particles are associated with one term or the other. But 
                                                
4 Gao (2017, 100–103) argues that Bohm’s theory is problematic under any assumption about 
how experience supervenes on the ontology of the theory. In particular, he argues that the 
instantaneous Bohmian particle configuration cannot ground determinate experience. However, I 
think this overlooks the possibility that the evolution of the particle configuration over time 
grounds experience. Indeed, Gao later notes the dynamical nature of neurochemical explanations 
of experience (2017, 134). 
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how do we know which term contains the particles? Well, to find out, we can consider the 
interaction of the flash with the human eye. We get a superposition of two terms describing the 
retina, where the Bohmian particles are associated with one of them. But how do we know which 
term contains the particles? We can proceed into the human brain: we get a superposition of two 
terms describing the state of the visual cortex, where the Bohmian particles are associated with 
one of them. But how do we know which one? We could consider the interaction of the visual 
cortex with some other region of the brain, but this is going nowhere. Rather, we just have to 
assume that at some stage we are directly aware where the particles are—we are directly aware 
of the configuration of Bohmian particles in parts of our brains. Otherwise, we could never know 
which wave packet contains the particles.5 
 There is a construal of this argument according to which it is unobjectionable: unless 
awareness arises at some stage in the above process, we couldn’t have knowledge of the outcome 
of the measurement. But the argument is surely fallacious if it is taken to imply that something 
needs to be posited to accomplish this awareness, something in addition to the process otherwise 
described. You need something beyond a flash on a screen in order for there to be awareness of 
the flash: what you need is a correlated brain state. But you don’t need to posit something in 
addition to the brain state in question in order for there to be awareness of the flash. Maybe you 
need something outside that particular brain state in order for there to be experience or 
knowledge of that brain state as an object of scientific inquiry, but that’s a separate issue. 
                                                
5 There is nothing distinctly Bohmian about this argument: we could replace the Bohmian 
particles with the underlying ontology of any other physical theory, and the question of how we 
know the state of that ontology can be asked at any stage of the measurement process. I consider 
the historical roots of this kind of “tempting argument” in section 5.   
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 Insistence on experience as exceptional in this way gives critics of Bohm’s theory some 
extra ammunition. For example, Brown and Wallace suggest that in order to defend Bohm’s 
theory, Dürr et al. (1992) and Maudlin (1995) have to assume that “our conscious perceptions 
supervene directly and exclusively on the configuration of (some subset) of the corpuscles 
associated with our brain” (2005, 534). But this assumption, they suggest, rests on the further 
assumption “that consciousness is some sort of bare physical property (like, say, charge) whose 
connection with physical matter can simply be posited rather as we posit other basic physical 
laws,” which in turn “makes consciousness completely divorced from any assumptions rooted in 
the study of the brain” (2005, 536). You can’t just posit a connection between experience and the 
physical brain; you have to discover the connection via neuroscientific study. 
 My claim here is that the assumptions about experience that Brown and Wallace object to 
are both entirely unnecessary and counter-productive for the Bohmian. There is no need for 
Bohmians to say anything special about experience: a measurement correlates some property of 
the measured system with the configuration of Bohmian particles in the measuring device, and 
eventually with the configuration of Bohmian particles in the brain of the human observer. As 
Maudlin (1995) rightly observes, that’s all that needs to be said by the interpreter of quantum 
mechanics. Dürr et al.’s “absolute uncertainty” result, which is exceptionless, ensures that 
measurements are always governed by the Born rule. There is no need for a further postulate 
about the connection between Bohmian particles and experience. 
 Furthermore, a postulate that says that we are directly aware of the positions of the 
Bohmian particles in our brains is counter-productive, serving only as a lightning-rod for 
criticism. By itself, such a postulate doesn’t work: direct “awareness” of the position of an 
isolated particle would not have the functional connections to other cognitive powers to truly 
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constitute awareness. And once you add the functional connections, it is unclear what the direct 
awareness was adding in the first place. Maybe we don’t know the full story about how the 
physical state of a human brain produces experience, but this is not a matter for interpreters of 
quantum mechanics to worry about. Whatever the full story is, it can surely be expressed in 
terms of the configuration of Bohmian particles.6 
 
4. The ugly 
So far, I have presented two examples of the discussion of experience in the literature on the 
foundations of quantum mechanics, one I take to be clearly good and the other I take to be 
clearly bad. But sometimes it is not so easy to tell whether a discussion of quantum mechanics is 
good or bad. I consider two such cases here, both of which concern the spontaneous collapse 
approach again.7 
 One of the earliest philosophical discussions of the spontaneous collapse approach is Bell 
(1987). Bell worries that the GRW theory represents the world using a wave function alone; this 
is a potential problem because the wave function is defined over a configuration space, with 3N 
dimensions for an N-particle system, not over ordinary three-dimensional space. Here is Bell’s 
proposed solution: 
However, the GRW jumps (which are part of the wavefunction, not something else) are 
well localized in ordinary space. Indeed, each is centered on a particular spacetime point 
(x, t). So we can propose these events as the basis of the ‘local beables’ of the theory. 
                                                
6 It is plausible that whatever the full story about experience is, it can also be expressed in terms 
of the wave function configuration. This is part of Brown and Wallace’s (2005) argument for the 
redundancy of the Bohmian particles, which I return to in section 5. 
7 There is, of course, nothing intrinsically ugly about these cases; they are only “ugly” insofar as 
they make life difficult for me in distinguishing good from bad uses of “experience”. 
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These are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events at definite places and 
times in the real world… A piece of matter then is a galaxy of such events. As a 
schematic psychophysical parallelism we can suppose that our personal experience is 
more or less directly of events in particular pieces of matter, our brains, which events are 
in turn correlated with events in our bodies as a whole, and they in turn with events in the 
outer world. (1987, 45) 
What is Bell up to here? It looks like he is postulating a direct connection between the physical 
world and experience as part of his exposition of the GRW theory. Isn’t that bad? 
 Something similar can be found in the work of Hameroff and Penrose (1996). They adopt 
a spontaneous collapse theory incorporating general relativity, according to which superpositions 
of distinct arrangements of matter produce superpositions of distinct space-time geometries. The 
latter superpositions are hypothesized to be unstable, collapsing to one matter arrangement or the 
other. They combine this spontaneous collapse theory with a particular account of conscious 
experience, according to which a conscious event is associated with a spontaneous collapse 
occurring in a specific neuronal structure (a coherent superposition involving a number of 
tubulin molecules). Again, Hameroff and Penrose seem to be postulating a direct connection 
between physics and experience as part of the exposition of their preferred quantum theory. 
 In the previous section I characterized postulating a connection between physics and 
experience as bad. But in each of the cases just described there are mitigating factors. In Bell’s 
case, I think he’s not really postulating such a connection at all; rather, his concern is to show 
that we can find our ordinary three-dimensional ontology in the 3N-dimensional wave function 
of the GRW theory. If we can’t, then a peculiar form of empirical inadequacy threatens: the 
theory says nothing about the three-dimensional world, and hence fails to predict experimental 
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outcomes expressed in three-dimensional terms. But if we can associate three-dimensional 
objects with sets of GRW collapse events, then we also find brains and their contents in the 
GRW ontology, since brains are three-dimensional objects. The “psychophysical parallelism” 
Bell outlines isn’t really an additional postulate, but simply an expression of the nature of 
physical stuff according to GRW, consistent with more or less any neurological theory of 
experience.8 
 Hameroff and Penrose cannot be defended in this way: they make it clear that they are 
postulating a particular connection between quantum collapse events and conscious experience. 
Rather, their approach here can be taken as exemplifying an objection to my claim that 
postulating a connection between physics and experience is a bad thing in discussions of the 
foundations of quantum mechanics. We don’t know the details of how the brain gives rise to 
conscious experience. Hameroff and Penrose are offering a hypothesis concerning some of those 
details, a hypothesis that is open to empirical test. Thus a prohibition on postulating a connection 
between quantum physics and experience looks like an unwarranted restriction on scientific 
exploration. 
 I think I have to grant this point. One can object to Hameroff and Penrose’s hypothesis on 
scientific grounds (e.g. Grush and Churchland 1995), but surely not on general methodological 
grounds. The unification of apparently disparate phenomena is a feature of several notable 
                                                
8 This is not to say that the GRW theory as Bell envisions it will automatically succeed in 
accounting for determinate measurement results or determinate experiences. Parallel concerns to 
those of Albert and Vaidman (1989) can be posed using Bell’s event-based GRW: perhaps there 
will be no collapse events associated with a particular measurement outcome, or with a particular 
mental state, because they involve too few particles. These concerns about experience are of the 
“good” kind explored in section 2. 
 15 
episodes of scientific progress. Hameroff and Penrose may or may not succeed at their chosen 
unification, but you can’t fault them for trying. 
 Note, though, that their proposal about conscious experience is quite cleanly separable 
from their proposal for solving the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Penrose (1996) 
formulates the latter without postulating any particular connection to consciousness—and 
indeed, the spontaneous collapse theory he develops seems consistent with more or less any such 
connection.9 Maybe he always had his eye on a connection to consciousness (Penrose 1994), but 
the interpretation of quantum mechanics itself does not appeal to any such connection. So 
Hameroff and Penrose (1996) does not constitute an objection to my thesis, construed as the 
claim that postulates about experience have no place within the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. 
  
5. The extent of the problem 
The examples considered in the previous sections show that “experience” and its cognates appear 
regularly in discussions of the foundations of quantum mechanics, and that such discussions are 
not always bad. It’s fine (and sometimes necessary) to consider whether some interpretation of 
quantum mechanics can account for the determinacy of experience. What’s not OK is to 
incorporate a posit about experience within the interpretation itself. 
 But is this really a significant problem? The example of section 3 could, for all I have 
said, be an isolated case—an offhand comment that doesn’t reflect anyone’s considered opinion 
about how to approach the foundations of quantum mechanics. However, a look at the history of 
appeals to experience suggests otherwise. 
                                                
9 Again, subject to caveats of the kind raised by Albert and Vaidman (1989). 
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 Consider, for example, the classic discussion of “psycho-physical parallelism” in von 
Neumann (1955). Von Neumann describes a simple temperature measurement, and notes that we 
can choose whether or not to include the thermometer in the physical analysis, and similarly for 
the eye and the brain of the human observer: 
But in any case, no matter how far we calculate—to the mercury vessel, to the scale of 
the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some time we must say: and this is 
perceived by the observer. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the 
one being the observed system, the other the observer. In the former, we can follow up all 
physical processes (in principle at least) arbitrarily precisely. In the latter, this is 
meaningless (1955, 419). 
There is something very like the “tempting argument” of section 3 in this passage; indeed, I take 
von Neumann to be the canonical source of such arguments. However, one might read von 
Neumann as talking about measurement rather than experience here: the discussion occurs at the 
beginning of a chapter called “The Measuring Process” in which he elaborates his proposal that 
measurements obey a different dynamical law from non-measurements. The folly of this 
approach to quantum mechanics is precisely Bell’s point in “Against “measurement””. 
 But this would not be the best reading of this passage, I think. Von Neumann’s goal in 
this chapter isn’t just to describe his collapse-on-measurement proposal; the discussion above 
occurs in the context of an attempt to justify it: 
Indeed experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain 
(subjective) observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value. 
Now quantum mechanics describes the events which occur in the observed world, so long 
as they do not intersect with the observing portion, with the aid of the process 2 [unitary 
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dynamics], but as soon as such an interaction occurs, i.e., a measurement, it requires the 
application of process 1 [collapse dynamics]. The dual form is therefore justified (1955, 
420).10 
That is, the duality in the dynamical laws is justified because it reflects a fundamental duality in 
nature. The distinction between measurements and non-measurements is clearly not fundamental, 
as Bell forcefully points out: measurements are just a rather loosely-defined set of ordinary 
physical processes. But the distinction between experience and that which is experienced—
between subjective and objective—looks at first glance like a reasonable candidate for such a 
fundamental distinction. Plausibly, it is that distinction that von Neumann is appealing to here. 
 However, the subjective-objective distinction as von Neumann understands it is unable to 
deliver the justification he needs for the duality in the laws. Von Neumann thinks that where we 
place the boundary between the experiencing subject and the experienced object “is arbitrary to a 
very large extent” (1955, 420). But the point at which the collapse dynamics takes over from the 
unitary dynamics is not a matter of arbitrary stipulation; it is empirically decidable, at least in 
principle (Albert 1992, 84). 
 What von Neumann needs is a precise boundary between those entities that precipitate 
collapse and those that do not. Such a sharp line can be had, at a cost: Wigner (1961), for 
example, proposes that there are fundamental facts about which systems are conscious, and that 
consciousness acts on physical systems to precipitate collapse. Note that these fundamental facts 
have to float free of the physical facts about a system if Wigner’s proposal is to avoid the 
problem that experiencing systems are just systems of atoms (see section 1). That is, Wigner 
postulates a strong form of interactive dualism in order to justify a duality in the physical laws. 
                                                
10 Von Neumann cites Bohr (1929) as the source of this line of justification. 
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 Few will want to follow Wigner down this path: non-physical minds, especially causally 
active ones, are mysterious at best. But the point is that unless you are willing to go to such 
extremes, von Neumann’s appeal to a fundamental subjective-objective distinction is idle: it 
doesn’t do the work he requires of it. Furthermore, by assuming that the physicist can simply 
posit a connection between the physical world and experience at her convenience, von Neumann 
opens himself to the objection that he is treating consciousness as “some sort of bare physical 
property”, rather than paying serious attention to the results of neuroscientific research (Brown 
and Wallace 2005, 536). 
 There are, of course, perennial (but controversial) arguments for the irreducibility of the 
mental to the physical, for example based on qualia (Chalmers 1996). But the existence of a 
“hard problem” of consciousness is distinct from the methodological question at issue here: 
whether or not qualia are irreducible, you can’t posit whatever psychophysical connection you 
like. Neuroscience constrains the connections between brain structures and experience, 
irrespective of whether what it tells us constitutes a reduction of qualia. 
 Nevertheless, von Neumann’s approach is tempting. It is tempting, I think, because 
coming up with a consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics is hard, and the freedom to 
simply posit a psychophysical connection appears to give you an additional free variable to play 
with in constructing an adequate theory. But this appearance is deceptive: the additional variable 
is only free because it is disconnected from anything that might do any genuine explanatory 
work, and because we are ignoring any constraints on the psychophysical connection coming 
from scientific research on the brain. 
 Dürr et al.’s exception to “absolute uncertainty” provides one example of succumbing to 
this temptation. But it is not hard to find others; I only need to look as far as my own CV. In 
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“How Bohm’s theory solves the measurement problem” (Lewis 2007), I attempt to resist Brown 
and Wallace’s (2005) redundancy argument against Bohm’s theory. Brown and Wallace argue 
that since experiences could supervene on the wave function configuration just as easily as on 
the Bohmian particle configuration, the Bohmian particles are redundant, and Bohm’s theory 
reduces to the many-worlds theory. I respond, in part, that the Bohmian can posit that we are 
directly aware of particle configurations in our brains. I now think this is a mistake: such a posit 
does no work, and ignores neuroscience. This is not to say that the redundancy argument 
necessarily succeeds: the argument can be resisted (see e.g. Ney 2013 and Callender 2015), but 
notably not by postulating a special connection between particles and experience. 
 Even Albert’s (1992, 107) thought experiment concerning determinate experience in the 
GRW theory, which I earlier characterized as “good”, raises some concerns. There is an 
assumption in Albert’s argument, namely that an “enhanced human” could, in principle, have an 
experience that is grounded in the position of a single particle. Is this a (bad) example of simply 
positing a psychophysical connection? Or is it just a conjecture for the sake of argument, one that 
might be overruled by research on the kinds of physical states that could possibly underlie 
experience? It is not easy to tell. 
 This is why my polemic against “experience” is not as straightforward as Bell’s polemic 
against “measurement”. It is relatively easy to tell whether a use of “measurement” in a 
discussion of quantum mechanics is good or bad, and a case for the badness of the bad uses can 
be made in relatively uncontroversial terms. But it is not so easy to tell whether a use of 
“experience” is good or bad, and even making the case that some uses are bad gets us into the 
contested territory of the nature of the mental. 
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 Nevertheless, I hope to have shown that it is worth trying to disentangle the good from 
the bad, because there are bad uses of “experience”, and they have the capacity to sow confusion 
in the foundations of quantum mechanics just as much as bad uses of “measurement”. Whatever 
the philosophical status of experience, the mental-physical connection is not something that 
philosophers or physicists can posit at their convenience. 
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